A PKI can be described as a set of technologies, procedures and policies for propagating trust from where it initially exists to where it is needed for authentication in online environments. How the trust propagation takes place under a specific PKI depends on the PKI's syntactic trust structure which is commonly known as a trust model. However, trust is primarily a semantic concept that can not be expressed in syntactic terms alone. In order to define meaningful trust models for PKIs it is also necessary to consider the semantic assumptions and human cognition of trust relationships, as explicitly or implicitly expressed by certification policies, legal contractual agreements between participants in a PKI, and by how identity information is displayed and represented. Of the many different PKI trust models proposed in the literature, some have been implemented and are currently used in practical settings, from small personal networks to large scale private and public networks such as the Internet. This article takes a closer look at the most prominent and widely used PKI trust models, and discusses related semantic issues.
INTRODUCTION
Trust is a directional relationship between two parties that can be called the relying party and the trusted party. One must assume the relying party to be a 'reasoning entity' in some form (Jøsang, 1996) , meaning that it has the ability to make evaluations and decisions about trust based on received information and past experience. The trusted party can be anything from a person, organization or physical entity, to abstract notions such as information or a cryptographic key.
A trust relationship has a scope, meaning that it applies to a specific purpose or domain of action, such as "to be authentic" for a cryptographic key, or "to provide quality service and repair" for car mechanics (Jøsang et al., 2005) . The literature uses the term trust with a variety of meanings (McKnight and Chervany, 1996) , so it is not always clear what authors mean by it. In order to avoid misunderstanding it is always useful to be specific and define the meaning of trust when using the term in a particular context.
A distinction should be made between interpreting trust as an evaluation or as a decision. When interpreting trust as a subjective evaluation of the reliability or correctness of something or somebody, it is called evaluation trust. When interpreting trust as a decision to enter into a situation of dependence on something or somebody, it is called decision trust. This distinction can appear subtle but is in fact quite fundamental. For example, having high evaluation trust in an entity is not necessarily sufficient to make a decision to enter into a situation of dependence on that entity if the risk is perceived as being too high. Evaluation trust reflects the reliability of the trusted party and is application and context independent, whereas decision trust depends on the particular application and on the context in which it is embedded. It can be shown that decision trust is a function of evaluations trust and risk (Jøsang and Lo Presti, 2004) .
Both evaluation trust and decision trust reflect a positive belief about something on which the relying party potentially or actually depends for his welfare. Evaluation trust is most naturally measured as a discrete or continuous degree of reliability or belief, whereas decision trust is most naturally measured in terms of a binary decision. Several authors have proposed to let certificates express levels of trust on a discrete or continuous scale, e.g. (Kohlas et al., 2008) . However, this would only be meaningful in case CAs are uncertain about the correctness of what they certify, and expressing levels of trust in the 3 (Internet Protocol) addresses in IPv4 would become to small, a new name space with 128 bits was designed for IPv6, with the result that IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are incompatible.
A pseudonym may be used as unique name in some systems for practical or privacy reasons in order to provide an anonymous identity (UK eEnvoy, 2002) . The pseudonym is a name where only the party that assigned the pseudonym knows the real world identity behind it. The pseudonyms can be selfassigned, so that the real world identity (e.g. that of a legal persona) behind the pseudonym is only known by the owner, and otherwise is hidden to all other parties. Alternatively, the pseudonym can be defined and escrowed by a trusted third party who knows the real world identity, and who is able to reveal it under special circumstances such as law enforcement.
Identities can be established in various ways. It can happen formally through a registration process managed by a registration authority, or informally through repeated interactions with other entities where various characteristics of the identity are exposed. The etymological meaning of identity is "the same one as last time". A requirement for establishing an online identity is therefore that a process exists for first time definition or registration of identity attributes. The registration of a new identity does not necessarily take physical world characteristics or other pre-existing attributes of the entity. A new identity can be defined from scratch with totally new attributes, in which case it becomes a virtual or pseudonymous identity. The important property is that the entity can be recognized with the same attributes in future interactions. This principle also applies to PKIs, so that the unique name and the other identity attributes in a certificate are not necessarily tied to a known real world entity. It is even possible to use the public key itself as unique name, in which case the user's identity is formed by the public key as well as other characteristics emerging from the user's online presence. The SPKI/SDSI model described below applies this principle.
Traditional public-key certificates establish a cryptographic binding between a public key and a unique name in a specific identity domain. Other (possibly non-unique) names may also be specified. It is crucial that the names are meaningful to relying parties. The identity with which a user is commonly recognized by relying parties do not necessarily contain the unique name stored in the certificate. In such case it must be possible to link the unique name to a meaningful identity, otherwise the certificate might become meaningless to relying parties. This problem will be discussed in the section on the Semantics of Trust and Identity below.
PKI TRUST STRUCTURES
The difficulty of ensuring secure key distribution is a major obstacle to practical use of cryptography. With traditional symmetric-key cryptography each pair of parties that want to communicate securely must exchange cryptographic keys out-of-band and thereby establish a direct trust relationship. The term outof-band denotes an external channel, i.e. outside the communication channel that the PKI is intended to protect. Secure out-of-band channels and direct trust relationships are typically expensive to set up and maintain, so finding ways to reduce their number can lead to significant cost savings. The main purpose of a PKI is to simplify key distribution by reducing the number of secure out-of-band channels needed. Trust in user public keys is then cryptographically derived from a limited set of direct trust relationships. In that sense, a PKI allows trust to be propagated from where it exists to where it is needed (Simmons and Meadows, 1995) .
A public-key certificate represents a trust edge from the CA to the owner of the certified public key. The traditional trust scope is that: "The owner of the public key rightfully holds the unique name specified in the certificate". Such certificates are often called identity certificates. Any user who can prove that they control the private key corresponding to the public key, will have proved that they also own the unique name written on the certificate. The proof is typically given through a cryptographic security protocol. An identity certificate thus creates a binding between a public-key and an identity. A certificate can also express other semantic concepts than a unique name, in which case it is called an attribute certificate. In theory, any assertable concept that can be related to a public key can be certified in an attribute certificate. Expressing access authorization is the most common usage of attribute certificates, whereby the trust scope could be: "The owner of the public key is authorized to access resource X". An attribute certificate thus creates a binding between a public key and specific attributes of the owner.
A relying party who trusts the CA, who has validated the certificate, and who has successfully executed an authentication protocol proof with the user, will be able to derive trust in the authenticity of the user identity as represented by the unique name specified in the certificate. A linked chain of certificates represents a trust path, and a collection of interlinked certificates represents a trust network. In general, any such trust network based on certificates can be called a PKI, but only a few trust network classes represent practical PKIs with viable business models. Recipients of public-key certificates, also called relying parties, do not themselves need certificates in order to authenticate a user's public key, they only need an authentic copy of the root public key. Only users that want to be authenticated need to have public-key certificates. In this chapter, a leaf certificate owner is called a user. A user can be a legal entity such as an individual or an organization, or it can be a system or process entity, or even an abstract role. Fig.1 illustrates the typical internal trust structure of a PKI and the graphical notation used in this chapter. The left hand side shows how the trust structure where the indexes indicate the order in which the trust relationships and digital signatures are formed. The right hand side shows the corresponding graphical PKI representation. It is assumed that a RA (Registration Authority) is part of both the root CA and the intermediate CA. The role of the RA is to pre-authenticate user identities based on physical world artifacts, and communicate the user identity (consisting of a set of attributes) to the CA. In reality, the RA can be separate from the CA in which case additional trust relationships between the CA and the RA are required. The public and private keys are illustrated as a white and a shaded key respectively in Fig.1 . The root CA, as well as intermediate CAs and users, are assumed to have complete trust in the authenticity of their own public-private key pair (index 1). The root CA generates a self-signed certificate (index 2) which is distributed through any suitable secure out-of-band channel to potential relying parties. When the root CA is assured about the identity of the intermediate CA and the authenticity of its public key it has established trust in the binding between the identity and the public key (index 3). The CA then issues a certificate to assert this fact according to a specific policy (index 4). Similarly, when the intermediate CA is assured about the binding between the user identity and the user's public key (index 5), it issues the user's public-key certificate that testifies this fact according to a specific policy (index 6). It should be noted that the root CA must also trust the intermediate CA regarding its reliability (competence and honesty) to correctly register and issue user certificates, so that the trust relationship between the root CA and the intermediate CA (index 3) normally has a double scope consisting of the explicit binding between the CA name and public key, as well as implicit reliability of the CA. The leaf trust relationship between the intermediate CA and the user (index 6) only has the explicit scope of binding between name and public key, i.e. it does not say anything about the reliability of the user. In practice this means that a CA will not check whether the user or organization buying a certificate is honest or competent in any regard because this is not within the trust scope of the user certificate.
There are various business models for CAs. Commercial CAs generate revenue by selling certificates, whereas internal CAs in an organization issue certificates to units in the organization as part of their function or role. Individuals can also act as CAs, such as in PGP described below, in which case they issue certificates for the benefit of their friends and connections.
Software systems are designed to store and process public keys in the form of certificates, and are usually unable to handle naked public keys. For that reason root public keys are normally distributed and stored in the form of a self-signed certificates. A root public key is thus part of a certificate that has been signed by the corresponding private key, as illustrated on the top of Fig.1 (index 2). Note that a selfsigned certificate provides no assurance whatsoever regarding the authenticity of the root public key, it only makes the distribution, storage and processing of root public keys more practical. This is because validation of the self-signed public key would have to be done with the same public-key. This would clearly be meaningless as a public key can not validate itself, and PKIs would be obsolete if public-keys were self-validating.
Certificate validation, normally done by the relying party, consists of verifying the correctness of the digital signature on the certificate. Data extracted from a validated certificate, such as name, public key, and other attributes are assumed to be authentic. A detailed illustration of the validation procedure and the derived trust in the user's public key is illustrated in Fig.2 . A relying party who holds an authentic copy of the root CA public key contained in a root certificate received through a secure extra-protocol channel, will be able to derive trust in the binding between the user public key and the user name. The identity of the root CA, normally represented by a unique name, must be known and recognized by users and relying parties in order to make trust in the root CA meaningful. Without recognition of root CA identity it is not possible to know who and what the self-signed root CA certificate represents. Relying parties must trust the root CA to be a genuine authority that is competent in issuing correct and authentic certificates. This makes it possible to depend on a certified key e.g. for authentication and digital signature verification. Owners of public keys must also trust the root CA to support authentication of their public keys e.g. by facilitating secure distribution of the root public key to potential relying parties. Users and relying parties can get this assurance for example when it is required that the root CA and intermediate CAs shall be accredited by government or other authoritative bodies to manage identity registration and public-key certification. This represents the trust anchor for users and relying parties.
When the authority of a root CA is based on governmental or other authoritative accreditation bodies, the decision to trust a root CA ultimately becomes a political and philosophical question. For a PKI that is only used internally in an organization, the directors of the organization represent the ultimate authority for establishing the root CA as a trust anchor. In social networks between people, the decision to trust a public key or certificate can be discretionary typically based on personal relationships.
In some PKIs the CA generates the public/private key pair on behalf of the user. It is also possible that users generate their own public/private key pairs, in which case the CA must verify that the user controls the private key corresponding to the public key to be signed. Whether the signing party generates the public and private keys for the owner, or receives it from the owner is only a practical issue, and is not important for a particular PKI trust model. However, it should be noted that a CA that generates a public/private key pair for a user is technically able to masquerade as the user and to decrypt confidential messages sent to the user, and must therefore be trusted not to do so. Identity trust provided by a PKI is only as strong as the underlying trust relationships on the left hand side of Fig.1 . It is normally assumed that the identity trust relationships from the root to the intermediate CAs, and onwards to the users are established out-of-band. This represents first hand direct trust relationships that form the basis for trust in PKIs. Such trust relationships are expensive, but the subsequent automated large scale distribution and validation of user certificates is supposed to make it worthwhile.
The exact method of establishing the trust relationships on the left hand side of Fig.1 must be specified in the Certification Policy. For low assurance certificates, a requirement can be that the identity is provided to the CA online in the form of an email address, and that the verification of the claim to hold a particular email address is verified by sending a message to the specified address and requiring a specific reply message. For a high assurance level certificate a requirement can be that the user individual or a representative of the user organization physically present themselves to the CA/RA with evidence of identity and authority.
Attribute certificates can express anything that the certifying party wants to assert in the certificate or in the corresponding policy. Roles and access authorization privileges are typical examples of attribute certificates. The subsections below describe the most common PKI structures and their corresponding trust relationships.
Single Hierarchic PKI
The PKI class with the most optimal key distribution characteristics is when all users depend on a single hierarchical PKI. The advantage of this structure is that only one root public key needs to be distributed to relying parties through a secure out-of-band channel. More specifically, each relying party must have the assurance that the received root CA public key is authentic. Note that the root public key can only be trusted by parties who have this assurance, and that it should be distrusted by parties who can not obtain this assurance.
The root CA must be trusted to represent a recognized authority that is competent and possibly accredited by a government or other authoritative body to manage identity registration and public-key certification. As already mentioned, the authenticity of the root public-key must be established with means external to the PKI itself. A trusted root CA with an out-of-band authenticated public key is called a trust anchor. Fig.3 illustrates a hierarchic PKI anchored on a self-signed root CA certificate. Assuming that a relying party receives a user public-key certificate, and that the root CA represents its trust anchor, then the relying party is able to authenticate the certified public key through resolution of the certification path from the root CA to the user certificate that contains the public key. This also assumes that all intermediate certificates in the path between the root and certificate are also available to the recipient. Single hierarchic PKIs can be operated by a single organization that operates the root and multiple intermediate CAs, or by a set of separate organizations under one common root CA. EuroPKI (http://www.europki.org/) is an example of the latter trust model which also could be described in terms of the bridge CA model described below.
Multiple Hierarchic PKIs
In case of multiple hierarchic PKIs it is possible that different user certificates belong to different PKIs. Assuming that each relying party shall be able to validate any user certificate from any PKI, then it is required that all root CAs represent trust anchors for the relying parties. In other words, all relying parties need to receive every root CA public key through a secure out-of-band secure channel. This situation is illustrated in Fig.4 . The main problem with this model is the increased burden on relying parties to obtain root CA certificates out-of-band. As already mentioned, out-of-band channels are expensive, and this model therefore does not scale well. Having a dynamic set of root CA certificates will only exacerbate this problem. A specific form of this PKI model is the so-called browser PKI implemented in combination with Web browsers. The channel for distributing the root CA certificates is by hard-coding them in the Web browser distributions. Whether the Web browser distribution represents a secure out-of-band channel is questionable. The hard-coding of root CA certificates enables automated validation of server 8 certificates for SSL/TLS and digital signatures on software. There are typically a few dozen root CA certificates in any major browser distribution. In Microsoft IE the list of root certificates can be viewed by
Typically in a browser, a substantial proportion of the pre-installed root certificates have expired several years back, even for newly downloaded browsers. Expired certificates are shipped with browsers e.g. in order to allow validation of legacy software, but shows that the model in fact is broken. Ignoring the validity period specified in a certificate for the sake of legacy functionality is a breach of the policy under which the certificates were issued.
The set of root CA certificates in the Web browser PKI model is dynamic, meaning that root certificates can be deleted and new root certificates can be added. This represents a real spoofing threat because it could be possible for attackers to replace a genuine root certificate with a false one. This attack could for example be executed by malware that gets installed on a victim computer. The authenticity of a root certificate depends on the security of the out-of-band channel through which it is obtained. Once a false certificate has been installed e.g. because the installation channel was insecure, it will not be possible for a relying party to detect that it actually is false. In practice, many people install browser PKI certificates and even root certificates based on discretionary ad hoc trust decisions, as described in the next section. This represents a real spoofing threat for identities on the Web.
Unfortunately, the Browser PKI is affected by serious vulnerabilities. One aspect is the fact that the Browser PKI is only as secure as the weakest of each separate PKI it contains, and each separate PKI is only as strong as the weakest of each CA member it contains. Thus, the more root certificates and the more subordinate CAs there are, the less secure the browser PKI becomes. There are several realistic scenarios for exploiting vulnerabilities in the Browser PKI, as explained below (Hayes, 2004) , (Soghoian and Stamm, 1995) .
1. Attack against a CA: VeriSign, the world's largest CA, issued false certificates in the name of Microsoft in 2001 when VeriSign staff failed to recognized that the persons buying the certificates were not Microsoft representatives (Microsoft, 2001 ). The false certificates were never used and VeriSign survived the breach with only a scratch to its reputation. In 2001 the Dutch CA DigiNotar was attacked by hackers who managed to gain access to DigiNotar's systems and generate false certificates. These certificates were used by criminals to conduct a man-in-the-middle attack against Google services (Mills, 2011) . A few months later DigiNotar was declared bankrupt. 2. Pressure or blackmailing against a CA: As part of the Stuxnet affair (Shakarian, 201) two separate Taiwanese software companies -Realtek Semiconductor Systems and JMicron Technology Corp -used their genuine software signing certificates to produced digital signatures for the malicious Stuxnet software, which enabled the attackers to install malicious software on computer systems inside Iran's nuclear production facility. The companies in question have not been sanctioned, and it is likely that the companies were pressured to use their private keys to sign the Stuxnet software. 3. Malicious CA: Technically seen any CA that is part of the Browser PKI is able to generate false certificates and false signatures that will be automatically validated by all standard computers worldwide. There would be many possibilities for a criminal CA, or for criminal staff members in an otherwise legal CA, to get financial profit or other advantages from issuing false certificates or generating false signatures.
The Browser PKI market is largely held by a small number of multinational companies. This market has significant barriers to entry since new providers must undergo annual security audits (such as WebTrust3 for Certification Authorities: http://www.webtrust.org/) to be included in the list of web browser trusted authorities. Once approved as member of the Browser PKI, a CA will get its root certificate distributed with the major web browsers and other application software to billions of users worldwide. More than 50 root certificates are installed and thereby automatically trusted by the most popular web browsers. A 2009 market share report from Netcraft (Netcraft Ltd., 2003) showed that VeriSign and its acquisitions (which include Thawte and Geotrust) held a 47.5% share of the Browser PKI certificate market, followed by GoDaddy (23.4%), and Comodo (15.44%).
Discretionary Direct Trust
The Discretionary Direct Trust model is not officially a PKI model because it breaches basic PKI trust principles. It is included here because it is extensively used on the Web and in other contexts where PKIs are implemented. In the discretionary direct trust model, the relying party receives a user certificate -or even a root certificate -online, and makes a discretionary decision to trust the certificate, as illustrated in Fig.5 . The discretionary direct trust model ignores the requirement of having secure out-of-band channels for receiving root certificates. Instead, in the discretionary direct trust model the relying party decides to trust a user certificate without a reliable root certificate as trust anchor, or decides to import a root certificate without verifying its authenticity. Convenience and cost saving are the main reasons for discretely trusting certificates in this way. This model can be used with low risk in situations where certificates are being used for nonsensitive applications. It is quite common that a certificate can not be validated because there is no available root, or because the policy for validation can not be satisfied e.g. when the root certificate has expired. A certificate that fails normal validation typically blocks service access, unless the certificate can be accepted in some other way. In such situations the relying party can simply make a discretionary decision to trust the certificate in order to access the service. However, this model is commonly used in situations where there is a real risk, such as when e.g. downloading and installing software. The problem with this model is that binary trust decisions are being made purely out of convenience, despite weak or non-existing direct evaluation trust. It can be argued that all PKI trust models are affected by this problem, because in many cases relying parties ignore the existence of root certificates, and even if relying parties know about root certificates there is often little or no basis for judging the authenticity of these certificates. This is a fundamental problem for all PKIs: the existence of a syntactic chain from root to user certificates is in itself meaningless; it is only when certificate chains have a reliable anchor that they provide a basis for reliable trust. So the morale is: Relying parties beware when making discretionary trust decisions in a PKI!
Cross Certification of Multiple Root CAs
A theoretically simple way to reduce the burden on relying parties is to let the root CAs cross certify their certificates. In that way, each relying party only needs to obtain one single root CA certificate, and still be able to validate any user certificate from other PKIs. This is illustrated in Fig.6 . The disadvantage of the cross-certified PKI model is that it significantly increases the burden on root CAs because each root CA must cross certify all other root CA certificates. The number of required cross certifications is (n(n − 1)/2) where n is the number of separate PKIs. This is the same as the number of symmetric keys needed in a community of n parties. Policies must be established for each cross certification, and this can become a significant burden on the root CAs, and some CAs might not want to participate in the cross certification, e.g. for political reasons. The cross certified PKI model therefore does not scale well and is impractical to implement.
Bridge CA with Multiple PKIs
An improvement over the previous model is to use a bridge CA between multiple root CAs. This has the advantage that the relying parties only need to obtain one root CA certificate through a secure out-of-band channel, and that each root CA only needs to cross certify with the bridge CA. This is illustrated in Fig.7 . The disadvantage of the bridge PKI model is that it might be difficult to define an acceptable policy for cross certification that is acceptable by all parties. Certain root CAs might not be willing to cross certify with the bridge CA, e.g. for political reasons. The bridge CA might refuse to cross certify with a root CA for similar reasons.
The PGP Trust Model
The commercial encryption tool called PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) (Lucas, 2006) , and its free version called GPG (Gnu Privacy Guard) (Callas et al., 2007) , provide support for managing public keys and public-key certificates. PGP represents a practical model for public key distribution and usage, and is therefore a PKI, but which not is based on a hierarchical model. In PGP/GPG every user plays the role of relying party, user and CA at the same time, which means that users can send and recommend certificates to each other. There are several methods for a user and relying party to obtain public keys of other users. It can take place through a secure out-of-band channel such as a physical meeting, it can happen through online trust decisions based on introductions of new certificates from previously trusted users, or it can be based on a discretionary trust decision when receiving a public key for example in an email message or downloaded from a website. Imported public keys are stored in a file called Publi-Key Ring as illustrated in Fig.8 below. The relying party can sign imported keys and specify the trust level in key as it is stored on the Public-Key Ring. Discretionary trust should be based on contextual evidence such as agreeing over the phone to send a public key via email, and then checking that the email is timely received as expected. Otherwise such trust decisions would have a weak basis.
Computed trust in imported public keys is derived using PGP's particular trust model which is described in (Lucas, 2006) . For example, the PGP tool can be configured to trust an imported public-key when it has been signed by a specific number of trusted users. The PGP tool will typically not trust a received key that has been signed by unknown or by untrusted users, but the relying party can always make a discretionary decision to trust and sign the imported public key.
It is worth mentioning that nobody makes a business out of selling certificates (i.e. signed keys) for PGP, so there is no business model for being a CA in PGP. Individuals and organizations adopt PGP/GPG for its simplicity and low start-up cost. The popularity PGP/GPG is due to the simplicity of using it and the fact that it fills a real need among users.
Validation Authority with PKIs
The task of obtaining root CA public keys through secure out-of-band channels and validating user certificates represent the the main burden for relying parties. Introducing a separate role to take this burden and to validate user certificates on behalf of the relying party introduces a new trust anchor called a VA (Validation Authority). This is illustrated in Fig.9 . It is not necessary for a VA to be a CA. An organization can operate a CA only, a VA only, or both at the same time. To have a certificate validated the relying party needs an online secure channel to the VA. This must be based on an initial exchange of cryptographic keys through a secure out-of-band channel. Validation is different from certification, so the initial key exchange does not need to be based on publickey cryptography. An initial exchange of symmetric keys is for example possible. The two important security aspects to consider is that the relying party must be able to authenticate the VA in order to have trust in the validated certificates. It might also be necessary for the VA to authenticate the relying party for accounting purposes.
The validation authority model fills a real need for relying parties, and represents a recent trend in the PKI industry (Ølnes, 2006) . VAs are independent of CAs, and their introduction makes it possible to connect multiple independent PKIs. While large and expensive PKI implementations often do not meet expectations in the market, the VA model might be the critical factor that can make PKI business models viable.
SPKI/SDSI and Delegation Certificates
A simple extension of the traditional hierarchical model is to let the certificate chain start from the relying party, so that the relying party in fact becomes a CA. The SPKI/SDSI model (Clarke et al., 2001) , (Ellison et al., 1999 ) is a PKI of this type, as illustrated in Fig.10 . Because every party, including the relying party, plays the role of a CA, the trust relationships in SPKI/SDSI will be similar to the internal trust relationships of traditional PKIs, as e.g. illustrated in Fig.1 . There are several reasons why this model is not widely used. It would for example require that every relying party obtains a public/private key pair, and it makes certificate chain discovery more complicated than in hierarchical models.
An original element of SPKI/SDSI is that public keys are used as unique names. It is thus possible for users to stay anonymous and only expose their online identities, as illustrated by the online trust relationships (index 5 and 8) in Fig.10 . Users also have the option to expose their physical world identities so that out-of-band trust in users (index 2) and public-keys (index 3) can be established. The distinction between trust in anonymous online users (index 5 and 8) and trust in their public keys (index 6 and 9) is quite subtle. Names represented by public keys are abstract notions that can not by themselves perform actions or apply digital signatures, only users can. It must therefore be assumed that public keys in SPKI/SDSI correspond to real users that potentially can be trusted. A user can of course delegate the signing and certification to a software process, but it must be assumed that the user ultimately controls it.
Trust in the public key is the belief that it correctly and uniquely represents the assumed user. The scope of the trust in anonymous users (index 5 and 8) is that they correctly issue the next certificate in the chain (index 10). Although SPKI/SDSI certificates are simpler than X.509 certificates because they do not contain a separate attribute in the form of a distinguished name as in traditional X.509 certificates, the trust model is more subtle and difficult to understand than that of traditional PKIs.
An additional usage of public-key certification chains is to support delegation, for example for authorization purposes (Ninghui et al., 2003) . This is the basis for the KeyNote authorization system (Blaze et al., 1999) where a certificate represents an authorization capability or privilege issued by the signing party. The relying party is the root of the delegation chain and will be able to validate and thereby trust the sink certificate in the chain and grant access as a function of the authorizations specified in the certificate. This represents an alternative to the traditional ACL (Access Control List) model of specifying access authorization policies. In a certificate based delegation model, the system does not even need to know the physical world identity of the certificate owner because the authorization is issued to an online identity represented by a public key. Whoever can prove that they control the private key corresponding to the certified public key will be granted access according to the authorization policy expressed in the certificate.
The DNSSEC PKI
Security threats against the DNS are many (Bellovin, 1995) , (Kaminsky, 2008) , which reduces the assurance in DNS responses such as IP address translations from domain names. The technical solution to this problem is DNSSEC (DNS Security Extension) (Arends et al. 2005) which is designed to protect Internet resolvers (clients) from forged DNS data, e.g. due to DNS cache poisoning attacks. All answers received with DNSSEC are digitally signed. The public keys used for validating the signatures are distributed through the DNSSEC PKI which has a single root. Through validation of the digital signature a DNS resolver gets assurance that the information received is identical (correct and complete) to the information on the authoritative DNS server, i.e. that the information has not been corrupted.
Interestingly, the leaf nodes of the DNS (Domain Name System) are the same as those of the browser PKI, thereby making them adjacent hierarchic structures as illustrated in Fig.11 where the multihierarchic browser PKI at the bottom is turned upside-down. Fig.11 it becomes obvious that the hierarchic structure of the DNS itself can be used as a PKI structure for user certificates. In fact DNSSEC is already an overlay PKI on top of the DNS making it possible for DNS resolvers (clients) to authenticate replies to DNS requests. The recent RFC6698 (Hoffman and Schlyter, 2012) proposes the TLSA protocol which is a TLS protocol for DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE). Basically, TLSA uses DNSSEC as a platform for distributing certificates for TLS, which thereby eliminates the requirement for having trust in third party CAs, and would therefore provide stronger security assurance than is currently possible with the Browser PKI. With ratification of RFC6698 as an Internet standard and proper implementation of the required software, it would be possible to phase out the problematic Browser PKI described above. With this solution it is possible to let server certificates be signed by the DNS zone where the corresponding server is located, as illustrated in Fig.12 . In the example, Barclays bank's online banking server is called ibank.barclays.co.uk where the certificate is used for TLS connections. The public-key certificate for this server is signed by the public key of the DNS zone barclays.co.uk. The certificate can be stored as a RR (Resource Record) on the DNS server for barclays.co.uk so that it is available to all clients accessing the server.
In case of DNSSEC the trust structure is taken very seriously and multiple trust anchors represented by trusted individuals in the Internet community. Online validation of the DNS root public key is not possible, and is therefore called a DURZ (Deliberately Unvalidatable Root Zone). It does not mean that the DNS root public key can not be validated at all, instead the root public key can be manually (or semi-automatically) validated through the multiple OpenPGP signatures (Callas et al., 2007) on the root public key, as illustrated in Fig.12 . So while the root public key associated with the "." DNS root can be downloaded online; its authenticity is based on some extra-protocol procedure. This can for example be that a DNS administrator obtains one or multiple OpenPGP public keys from people they trust, which in turn makes the DNS administrator able to manually validate the DNS root public key.
This solves the problem of depending on a separate trust structure in the form of the Browser PKI which in addition must be characterized as relatively unreliable. Not only will the reliability of server authentication be strengthened, the cost can also be reduced because of the simplified infrastructure. When DNSSEC is deployed anyway it might well be used as a platform for signing and distributing server certificates.
SEMANTICS OF TRUST AND IDENTITY
In a trust relationship the relying party has an implicit or explicit interpretation of the trust involved. The trust scope is the specific type(s) of trust assumed in a given trust relationship. In other words, the trusted party is relied upon to have certain qualities, and the scope is what the relying party assumes those qualities to be.
In the case of PKIs, the trust scope is specified in a certification policy. It is crucial for the relying party to correctly understand the trust scope expressed in the policy. Misunderstanding the trust scope of a certificate is the same as misplaced trust, which is a vulnerability that can be exploited by attackers. A typical misunderstanding is that identity certificates somehow provide assurance of the honesty and reliability of the identity owner. However, the fact that a user is authenticated does not say anything about whether that user is honest or malicious. This common misunderstanding is for example the basis for phishing attacks.
CAs must take care to avoid any liability that could lead to legal or financial risk, and typical certification policies therefore contain legal jargon and liability disclaimers. Some CAs are so concerned about liability that they even specify: "No Liability Accepted" in the issuer name field inside the certificate itself.
Having certificates that provide assurance in the honesty and reliability of the certificate owner is almost unthinkable because of the liability risk the CA would need to accept. While a typical certification policy can be several pages long, the essence of it can usually be expressed in one simple sentence, such as "The owner of the certified public key rightfully holds the specified name". In the browser PKI, the key owner's domain name (or URL) is the unique name. In theory, a server certificate enables a relying party (service user) to authenticate the identity of the owner of a public key (service provider), but in practice this is not always possible due to the mismatch between the unique name (domain name) and the service provider's identity as seen by the relying party. When a unique name is not recognized as a representative of the identity, then it becomes meaningless to authenticate the identity by the unique name, as the example below will illustrate. The semantic distance between what is certified and what people think is certified is a problem for digital signatures in general (Jøsang, Povey and Ho, 2002) .
To authenticate is to verify the correctness of a claim to a specific identity. In case the verification succeeds, the identity has been confirmed and the relying party can decide to proceed with the transaction. In case the verification fails, the relying party should interrupt the transaction. Authentication therefore involves a decision by the relying party. With the browser PKI it is often impossible to make an informed and meaningful decision because the URL often does not represent a meaningful name in the eyes of a human relying party.
The most common usage of the web PKI is to support TLS, where a closed padlock in the corner of the web browser indicates that the session is secured with TLS. The relying party can inspect various types of information about the server certificate, but unfortunately this information is not necessarily sufficient to make an informed and meaningful conclusion about the identity of the web server.
We will consider the real fraudulent phishing site with the URL http://www.hawaiiusafcuhb.com that targeted the online Hawaii Federal Credit Union bank in March 2007 (Jøsang et al., 2007) .
Assuming that potential victims want to inspect the server certificate for its authenticity and validity, it is interesting to see that it actually provides very little useful information. Fig.13 shows general information about the attacker's certificate as it can be viewed through the Microsoft Internet Explorer browser.
Figure 13: Fake certificate general info
More detailed information can be viewed by selecting the "Details" and "Certification Path" placeholders on the certificate window. This gives the fraudulent certificate's validity period and the certification path from the root to the fraudulent certificate. However, this additional information gives no indication that the certificate is fraudulent.
The unique name in the fraudulent certificate is the domain name to which the fraudulent certificate is issued, specified as www.hawaiiusafcuhb.com, which is equal to the URL of the fake login page. The question now arises whether this represents sufficient evidence for the relying party to detect that the certificate is fraudulent. In order to find out, it is necessary to compare the fraudulent certificate to the genuine certificate of the genuine Hawaii Federal Credit Union illustrated in Fig. 14.
Figure 14: Genuine certificate general info
The unique name of the genuine certificate's owner is the domain name to which the genuine certificate is issued, specified as hcd.usersonlnet.com. Interestingly this domain name does not correspond to the URL of the genuine Hawaii Federal Credit Union which is www.hawaiifcu.com.
Intuitively this fact seems to indicate that the login page is not related to the genuine Hawaii Federal Credit Union. Based on this evidence, relying parties who inspect the certificate could therefore falsely conclude that the genuine login page is fake.
This analysis indicates that not even information found in certificates is sufficient to make the correct security conclusion and trust decision. The certificate window of Fig.14 provides a click-able button called "issuer statement" that opens a new window with the certificate issuance policy, which is a 2,666 word document (approximately four full standard pages in MS Word). While it might provide sufficient information to judge the legal status of the certificate, the size of this document alone makes the mental load of reading it intolerable for a human. In order to better understand why TLS can lead to a false positive authentication conclusion, it is useful to look at the very meaning of authentication.
According to the standard definition, peer-entity authentication is "the corroboration that a peer entity in an association is as claimed" (ISO, 1988) . However, even if the claimed name can be verified, it is insufficient to make an informed trust decision in case the name itself is not recognized by the relying party. The identity of the genuine bank as recognized by the customer is not the same as the URL name of the same genuine bank recognized by the TLS client. Thus, the bank is an entity with multiple identities.
From the customer's perspective, the ordinary name and logo of the bank constitute a large part of the identity. From the client browser's perspective, this identity cannot be used because normal names are ambiguous and visual/graphical logos can not be interpreted.
Certificates, which must be unambiguous, require globally unique names in order to allow efficient automated processing. Domain names mostly satisfy this requirement (although they can change over time: http://www.taguri.org/) and have therefore been chosen to represent the identity of online banks in server certificates. Having different identities for the same user can obviously cause problems. A theoretical solution to this problem could be to require that relying parties learn to identify online service providers by their domain names. Unfortunately this solution is jeopardized by banks often using multiple and different domain names depending on the specific service being offered.
As illustrated by the certificate of the genuine Hawaii Federal Credit Union bank of Fig.14 , it is common that a company's secure web site has an URL with a non-obvious domain name that does not correspond to the domain names of its main web site. An additional vulnerability is the fact that distinct domain names can be very similar, for example differing only by a single letter so that a false domain name may pass undetected. How easy is it for example to distinguish between the following URLs? http://www.bellabs.com, http://www.belllabs.com, http://www.bell-labs.com.
The crux of the problem is that domain names provide relatively poor usability for identification of organizations by people. This is because domain names are globally unique and therefore are not memorable. Ordinary names are suitable for dealing with organizations in the real world, but not for automated online authentication. The consequence of this is that relying parties do not know which service provider identity to expect when accessing online services. This is thus a case of cryptographically strong authentication which is semantically meaningless. In other words, the relying parties do not know which security conclusion to draw and trust decision to make. This vulnerability is for example the basis for phishing attacks. An early description of this problem and how it can be exploited by attackers is provided in (Jøsang et al., 2001) .
Current approaches to solving the phishing problem include anti-phishing toolbars. Most antiphishing toolbars are based on one or a combination of the following elements: blacklists, whitelists, ratings, heuristics (Cranor et al., 2006) . However, none of these elements attempt to solve the fundamental problem of mapping the unique domain name contained in the certificate to a user-friendly identity that a human relying party can recognize. Thus they do not improve the relying party's ability to authenticate the server, but is a tool for flagging and avoiding potential malicious servers.
A more fundamental approach to solving the phishing problem is the Mozilla TrustBar (Herzberg and Gbara, 2004 ) which aims at making authentication meaningful for the relying party. The Mozilla TrustBar solution consists of personalizing every server certificate that the relying party needs to recognize. The personalization can e.g. consist of linking the certificate to an image or an audible tune of the relying party's choice. This method, called a Petname System, allows users to define their own personal "petnames" for services that they frequently use (Ferdous et al., 2009) . This makes authentication meaningful, and represents a user-centric approach to identity management (Jøsang and Pope, 2005) . Petname Systems are described in more detail in the chapter entitled Entity Authentication & Trust Validation in PKI using Petname Systems in this book.
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
In the evolutions of PKIs the main focus has traditionally been the PKI architecture and syntactic structure of certification, as well as policies and legal context in which PKIs are embedded. There are many unsolved problems under these categories, such as the overhead of certificate revocation, complexity of automated validation, as well as weak liability of erroneous certificates.
Areas that have received relatively less attention are the semantic and cognitive aspects of PKIs, which is unfortunate because the most frequent cause of authentication failure is precisely that relying parties misinterpret or ignore the syntactic identity that technically is being authenticated through the PKI. Research challenge for solving the latter problem should focus on usability and identity cognition.
Another crucial aspect that is commonly ignored is the method and assurance of obtaining root certificates. Policies are often silent on this issue, and CAs have an interest in ensuring simple and low cost distribution of their respective root certificates, which obviously runs into conflict with requirements for having secure out-of-band distribution channels for root certificates.
Given the many issues of PKIs that potentially can lead to authentication failure there is a need to consider the factors underlying the authentication assurance level that a particular PKI can provide. There are e.g. proposals for establishing service provider authentication frameworks, similarly to national user authentication frameworks (Jøsang et al., 2012) . The method for distributing root certificates would naturally be included as one such assurance factor.
Although apparently simple, a PKI is much more complex to design and more expensive to operate than was first anticipated. In a nutshell, the challenge is to find satisfactory solutions to the remaining design issues, and to establish sound practices that have viable business models.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Assurance provided by a PKI is based on a set of direct trust relationships established out-of-band between the CAs within a PKI as well as between the external relying parties and root CAs of the PKI. While the establishment of direct trust relationships is slow and expensive, a PKI can be leveraged to support automated and efficient large scale distribution of user public-keys which in turn can support cryptographic security services.
Having a sound basis for trust in a PKI is crucial for the security of the applications and services it supports. Misplaced trust could lead to large scale vulnerabilities and attacks, so correct interpretation of the assurance provided by PKIs is crucial. The wave of recent phishing attacks is in fact a result of misunderstood trust in the security provided by the browser PKI and server certificates. It is often incorrectly believed that certificates provide assurance of reliability of a user or a service provider, whereas in reality they only provide assurance about identities or specific attributes.
The assurance that certificates provide must be described in the certification policies, but most relying parties never read the policies, and even if they did the policies would be difficult to interpret. In case of human relying parties, the difficulty of understanding and interpreting certification policies is a security usability problem. There is a great potential for improving the security of applications that depend on PKIs by improving the usability of interpreting certificates and their corresponding certification policies.
